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Summary
In 1996, within the space of a mere five months, the American Congress passed two laws which tigh-
tened up the USA's economic embargo against Cuba, Iran, and Libya. The Cuban Liberty and De-
mocratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act also provide for sanctions
against firms and persons from third countries who refuse to fall into line with the stricter American
sanctions regulations.
By threatening to impose these kinds of secondary sanctions, the USA is seeking to get its laws and
policies enforced outside as well as inside its own territory, and to force others—first and foremost its
allies—to toe the line against their will: they are being presented with the alternative of maintaining
economic relations either with the USA or with those countries against which America has instituted
sanctions. In acting in this way, the USA is violating both international law and some of the central
rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Underlying the dispute is a clash of
views about how to deal with totalitarian regimes. Whilst the Europeans share the United States' poli-
tical goals, they contest the American view that political and economic isolation is the appropriate
means to achieve them.
The United States thus once again succumbed to the temptation of unilateralism—not because, as the
last remaining superpower, it is suffering from hubris, but because the structural changes in the inter-
national system have caused the inherent dominance of domestic politics in the USA to make itself felt
more strongly. The two sanctions acts are thus not electorally determined 'slip-ups', but an expression
of the greater importance of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policy. At the same time,
they signal that the USA has become less predictable as a leading power. The American election,
which played a crucial role in the adoption of secondary sanctions, merely reinforced the existing
trends, because it enabled interest groups to exert a disproportionate influence on the foreign-policy
decision-making process.
The initiative for the imposition of secondary sanctions came from Congress. The latter's changed role
in the USA's foreign-policy decision-making process, and its changed composition, played a major
part. Its influence on the formulation of foreign policy has increased with the ending of the Cold War,
it has assumed a more active role in foreign policy and is demanding to have its say. Since it traditio-
nally gears its decision more to internal political requirements and particular interests, the chances of
well-organized interest-groups to exert an influence have increased, and local considerations have
acquired greater significance.
The trend towards a more strongly domestically determined foreign policy was reinforced by the 'con-
servative revolution' in Congress in 1994. It increased the number of those who rejected multilatera-
lism and international co-operation and placed their trust in unilateral solutions and emphasis on Ame-
rican military strength —a trend which continued with the 1996 elections. It is therefore likely that in
future, internal politics will be given greater weight.
The coming-into-force of the law was made possible by a president faced with the question of whether
he should promote observance of international law and regime rules, or should give priority to the
satisfaction of particular internal political interests, in order not to endanger his chances of re-election.
He opted for the latter and refrained from using his veto. He did this even though he was against the
use of secondary sanctions as a means of enforcing American policy and was aware that in using them
the USA was in flagrant violation of international law and the rules of the world trade regime. Clinton
thus failed to fulfil his constitutional tasks of providing a counterweight to, and controlling authority
for, the often very locally oriented decisions of Congress, of taking account of the national interest,
and of ensuring observance of international contractual obligations and internati al law.
Finally, the secondary sanctions are a reflection of the USA's decreased political scope for action,
which has boosted the importance of symbolic politics. The imposition of sanctions suggests resolve
and strength and thus reduces the political costs of non-action — which is why it has been a favourite
device of all presidents. This is especially true in situations where the threat posed by the opponent has
previously been overdramatized. Furthermore, sanctions appear cheap in internal political terms, be-
cause the costs in external political and external economic terms (where counter-measures are taken)
are only seen and felt in the longer term. But their increasing popularity is also an effect of declining
external political budgets, which debar the USA from other options for action. It is therefore likely that
the importance of sanctions in the USA's external political arsenal will not diminish but increase.
And yet there are important differences between the two sanctions acts. The Cuban Liberty and De-
mocratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton Act) is primarily the product of the influence of a small extre-
me right-wing group of Cuban exiles and of President Clinton's conceding against his better judge-
ment. By means of this act, the Cuban exiles managed not only to tighten up and codify the US eco-
nomic embargo that had been in force since 1962, but also to curtail the president's competencies in
foreign affairs. At the same time, the present analysis shows that the act's provisions are not appr-
priate for achieving the democratization of Cuba which the authors of the act claimed was their objec-
tive.
In the case of Iran, on the other hand, the USA found itself in a structural dilemma. It had the legiti-
mate goal of wanting to deprive the country of the means to expand its military power and strength,
which constituted a security risk; but it could not fulfil this goal without its allies' co-operation, and
this they refused to give. However, it is not only the USA, but the whole international community, that
is confronted with the problem of how Iran might be persuaded to change its policy. Up to now, it is
clear that neither the strategy of containment and complete isolation of the country, nor the 'critical
dialogue' pursued by the Europeans has been a success. It is therefore time that both sides showed a
willingness to enter into dialogue and to try jointly to work out an alternative strategy.
The fact that the US administration, out of internal political and electoral calculations, is abandoning
central principles of its foreign policy, violating international rules, and ignoring the interests of its
European allies, raises the question of the reliability of the USA as a leading world power and as gua-
rantor of the world order and the international regimes which it has itself created. For the Europeans,
the question arises as to how—without jeopardizing the existence of the regime by their own actions—
they should deal with a leading power that has become less predictable, violates the rules of the regi-
me, and itself puts the regime at risk?
The EU has lodged a complaint against the Helms-Burton Act with the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Like Canada and Mexico, it sees the act as a violation of the provisions of the 1993 Uruguay
Round agreement. The USA does not deny that its action violates the rules of the world trade regime;
but it seeks to justify the violation by reference to a GATT exception clause designed "to preserve
national security"'— a clause that has been invoked only in exceptional cases throughout GATT's hi-
story. Whereas a GATT panel previously ruled that secondary sanctions were not in accord with the
rules of the trade regime, there has hitherto never been a ruling as to whether an invocation of this
clause was warranted or not.
Yet, because of the changes in the dispute-settlement procedure and the short time which the WTO as
a new organization has had to prove itself in the eyes of its opponents in the USA, the European com-
plaint to the WTO harbours a great political danger as regards the continued existence of the regime,
and support for it in the USA. Should the panel decide that secondary embargoes are not covered by
the GATT security clause, and thus contravene GATT, it risks its judgement being interpreted and
represented by the USA's opponents in a way that implies that the GATT rules prohibit the USA from
defending its security interests. This could do great damage to the fragile consensus which the newly
created WTO enjoys in the USA. The credibility of the WTO in the USA would then, in certain cir-
cumstances, be discredited even before it had had an opportunity to prove the fairness of the new
procedure. In the worst case, this would cause a 'backlash' in Congress and lead to America's mem-
bership of the WTO being called into question.
Should the panel decide that the secondary sanctions are in accordance with the rules of the trade re-
gime, this too would be deleterious to the regime. The floodgates would be opened for a general invo-
cation of the security clause. Smaller member-states in particular would view this as an abuse of po-
wer by the USA, and the operation of the trade regime as a strong rule-oriented and power-oriented
regulatory instrument would be placed in doubt.
Whilst the European complaint threatened to land the WTO between Scylla and Charybdis, the US
declaration that the WTO has no competence to judge this question and its announcement to boycott
the panel procedure not only challenged the right of the WTO to judge complaints. It also undermined
the authority of the organization and its mechanism to settle disputes, the main tool for enforcing trade
rules. The compromise that was struck in April 1997 does not solve the conflict, it merely averts the
immediate threat of a further escalation of the conflict. The damage to the reputation of the WTO is
nevertheless done.
The Europeans should avoid to push its complaint to the WTO further, because the risk associated
with the complaint is too great for the regime. Instead, they should stick to effective counter-measures
such as the anti-boycott legislation, because they raise the costs of illicit behaviour for the USA. Such
measures are also an effective means of mobilizing American economic opposition. Pressure from the
US business community is the best means of persuading Congress to lift or revoke the sanctions laws
and to be dissuade to use secondary sanctions as a means for promoting its foreign policy goal. In ad-
dition, the Europeans should seek to exert greater influence on the internal political decision-making
process in the USA, by making it clear to the decision-makers that upholding the trade regime and
respecting its rules is in the USA's own interests.
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